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THE RULE IN SHELLEY'S CASE IN
NORTH CAROLINA
NORMAN BLOCK*
This article deals with the application of the Rule in Shelley's Case,
in North Carolina.' The statement of the Rule as a proposition of
law is simple enough in itself. But because of the antiquity of the Rule
and the confusion that its application has wrought among the courts,
I have deemed it necessary to treat briefly but thoroughly the origin
of the Rule, its character, and the theories concerning its application.
PART I. THE RuLE
Sec. 1. Statement of the Ride: The rule of law known throughout
the common law countries as the Rule in Shelley's Case was a part of
the common law of England long before the famous case of Judge
Shelley was decided.2 The Rule briefly stated is this: that where an
estate of freehold, either legal or equitable, is given to A, and by the
same instrument, either mediately or immediately, a respective legal or
equitable remainder is given to the heirs or the heirs of the body of A,
the words "heirs" or "heirs of the body of A" are words of limitation
and not words of purchase.2 It is important to draw, and constantly
* Associated with the law firm of Brooks, McLendon & Holderness, Greens-
boro, North Carolina.
"Scope Note: Statutory changes in the law of real property that touch upon
the subject material of the Rule have been inserted under the head of North
Carolina Statutes. Cases dealing with slaves have been collected and are grouped
in a footnote on the application of the Rule to personal property, infra note 48.
The remainder of the treatment deals with the application of the Rule. A
separate section has been devoted to the intent of the testator, (Part II, Sec. 5).
Part IV treats of the estate of the ancestor; Part V, the remainder; Part VI,
executory trusts; Part VII, powers to appoint; and Part VIII, heirs or heirs
of the body made words of purchase. In North Carolina certain types of
executory limitations over on default of heirs or heirs of the body of the holder
of the particular estate take the limitation out of the Rule. The cases dealing
with these limitations have been collected and classified in Part IX. Cross
references to the various sections have been inserted in the footnotes where it
has been deemed necessary.
This article does not deal with statutes abolishing the Rule.
The subject matter is so broad that any conclusion would merely be a summary
of the various sections. In the place of a conclusion, I have attempted to treat
the problems under each section in a concise manner, and there offer certain
suggestions pertinent to the problem treated in that section.
Because of the doctrine in North Carolina that certain types of executory
devises take the limitation out of the Rule, the modem cases in which the Rule
is applicable are limited. Since most modem devises involve some types of
executory limitation over, it would perhaps be a wise policy on part of the legis-
lature to abolish the Rule by statute.
2KALES, CASES ON FUrURE INTEREST (2d ed. 1936) 118.
'Wolfe v. Shelley, 1 Co. 93b, 76 Eng. Rep. 206 (C. B. 1581); 1 FEAPNE,
CoNT. REM. (4th Am. ed. 1906) *28; 1 PRESTON, ESTATES (1828) *263.
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keep in mind, the difference between words of purchase and words of
limitation. Words of purchase are words in an instrument which
taken absolutely by themselves, without any reference to any other
words in the instrument, first attach an estate to a person or group of
people. Words of limitation are words which by referring to some
other words in the instrument describe the extent or size of an estate
that has already attached to some person.4 And so when the Rule
says that the words "heirs" or the "heirs of the body" of A are words
of limitation and not words of purchase, it simply means that "heirs"
or the "heirs of the body" refer to and are read in connection with
the estate given to A extending or modifying that estate, and are not
taken as describing a group to whom an estate will first attach.
Sec. 2. History of Shelley's Case: A short sketch of Shelley's case
will clarify the nature of the Rule. Edward and John Shelley were
tenants in tail of a vast estate. Edward had two sons, Henry, the first-
born, and Richard. Edward Shelley made plans to suffer a common
recovery, in which he covenanted that the lands should be to the use
of A (himself) for life, then to the use of certain persons for twenty-
four years, then to the use of the heirs male of the body of A and of
the heirs male of the body of such heirs male. In the meantime, Henry
Shelley, the oldest son, died, leaving his wife enceinte. Subsequent to
Henry's death, the recovery was suffered, judgment given on it, and a
writ of seisin was issued. However, on October 9, several hours before
the above proceedings were completed, Edward Shelley, the father, died.
On October 19, the writ of seisin was executed. Richard Shelley, the
younger son, entered the lands and took possession of them. On
December 4, a posthumous child was born to the wife of the late
Henry Shelley. He was christened Henry. Richard Shelley leased the
lands to Wolfe. Later, Henry, the son of Henry the first and grandson
of John Shelley, ousted Wolfe, and a suit was brought to recover the
lands in an action of ejectment.
There were several issues in the case: (1) was a recovery executed
after the death of the recoveree valid? (2) did the writ of seisin make
the recovery ineffective? and (3) was the entry of Richard lawful?
Now, there was a rule of law then existing that if one was in possession
of land by purchase he could not be ousted by an after-born heir, but
if he were in by descent the after-born heir was entitled to the land.5
Admitting for the sake of argument that the recovery was well
executed, the plaintiff argued that Richard must take by purchase.
Counsel for the plaintiff strongly contended that the words "heirs male
of body of Edward Shelley," found in the remainder, were words of
' 1 FEAINE, op. cit. supra note 2, at *77.
'See Wolfe v. Shelley, 1 Co. 93b, at 98b, 76 Eng. Rep. 206, 222 (C. B. 1581).
[Vol. 20
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purchase, for if they were words of limitation then the words next
following, to-wit, "heirs male of body of such heirs male" would be
meaningless, because words of limitation cannot be added to words
of limitation. 6 When Coke, the counsel for defendant, was pressed on
the point, he answered that "it is a rule in law when the ancestor by
any gift or conveyance takes an estate of freehold, and in the same
gift or conveyance an estate is limited, either mediately or immediately,
to the heirs in fee or in tail . . . that always in such cases 'the heirs'
are words of limitation of the estate and not words of purchase."
(Emphasis ours.) If they had been words of purchase, Coke argued,
"violence would be offered .. to the meaning of the parties; for if the
heir male of body of Edward Shelley should take as purchasers, then
all other issue male of the body of Edward Shelley would be excluded
to take anything by the limitation; and it would be against the expressed
limitation of the party."'
The Court decided that the entry by Richard was unlawful and
plaintiff should take nothing by his bill, adopting as one of its reasons
the rule advanced by Coke. This case firmly established an already
existing rule of law, and specifically held that the further addition of
words of limitation to "heirs" or "heirs of the body" in the remainder
did not prevent the Rule from operating, provided the future limitation
was to the heirs of the same quality.8
Sec. 3. Theories of Origin of the Rule: No one knows exactly how
long the principle announced in the Rule had existed prior to Shelley's
case. Lord Coke in his edition of Littleton mentions the principle of
the Rule in speaking of fee tail. He discusses it under the caption
"Reversion of Fee Simple in the Donor." He writes: "If a man makes
a feoffment in fee and limits the use to his daughter for life, after her
decease to his son in tail, and after to the use of right heirs of feoffer,
though he parted with the whole fee yet he has the reversion . . .for
wheresoever the ancestor takes an estate for life and after him a limi-
tation to his right heirs, they shall not take as purchasers."9 Coke speaks
of a man carrying all his heirs in his own body and adds "this ap-
peareth in the common case that if land be given to a man and his
heirs, all his heirs are so totally in him as he may give the land to whom
he will." He further said that there were many cases in the books to
illustrate the rule.1 0 The earliest case found in the books is Abel's
ca~e.ll
6 1d. at 95b, 76 Eng. Rep. 206, 212. 7 Id. at 104a, 76 Eng. Rep. 206, 235.8 bid.; CHALI.Is, REAL PROPERTY (3rd ed. 1911) 164.
o Co. Li *. 22b. 10.1d. at *376b.
"IY. B. 18 E. 2 (1001), 7 Man. & G. 938, at 941 n. (c), 135 Eng. Rep. 381,
383 (1844) (translation).
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At least seven theories have been advanced to explain the origin
of the Rule:
(1) That It Is to Prevent Fraud on Feudal Tenures.
The Rule is supposed to have originated at the time when the feudal
system was the economic and political basis of society. Under the
feudal rules governing real property, certain dues had to be paid by
those who took by descent. It had become a practice on the part of land-
owners to attempt to escape these dues.12 The large landowners at-
tempted to escape feudal dues by making their heirs purchasers by
way of remainder following a life estate retained by themselves. But
because of the then existing strong policy favoring feudal dues, the
courts stepped in and declared that where the ancestor retained the
freehold, such a remainder would be a fraud on the overlord, for the
heirs would enjoy all the advantages of descent and none of its bur-
dens; therefore, such heirs could not take as purchasers by way of
remainder.' 3 From this point of view the Rule in Shelley's Case is in
keeping with the rule that a man cannot make his heirs purchasers (by
that name) of the estate they should take by descent.
(2) To Prevent the Inheritance from Being in Abeyance.
It appears that this theory is really the same as the one discussed
above. However, it is generally classified by itself. It was a cardinal
point of feudal property law that the seisin should never be in abeyance.
As Mr. Preston points out,14 the common law courts reasoned that if
'the heirs took by purchase after the termination of the prior estates of
freehold, the fee and the right would have been in nobody. Justice
Blackstone, in Perrin v. Blake,' 5 gives support to this theory.
(3) The Rule Finds Its Origin in the Relation of "Heirs" and
Ancestor.
Those who support this theory start from the well-settled proposi-
tion that a limitation to "A and his heirs" gives A the fee, and they
reason that there is no fundamental difference between a limitation to
"A and his heirs" and a limitation to A for life, remainder to B for
life, remainder to heirs of A (or heirs of his body). Mr. Preston quotes
Chief Baron Gilbert on this point: "As one gives the same in expressed
words and more, and the interposition of another estate between them
only breaks the order of the limitation and not the operation of the
12 This practice later caused the passage of a statute annulling feoffments made
fraudulently to those who would be -heirs of the feoffer; 52 Hen. III, c. 6
(1267) ; 2 PREsroN, op. cit. supra note 3, at *295.
"' Co. Lrr. *376b, n. II; 1 FEARNE, op. cit. supra note 3, at *84, et seq.;
1 P sToN, op. cit. supra note 3, at *263; CHALLis, op. cit. supra note 8, at 166;
KALES, CASES ON FuTuRE INTEREST (1917) 253, n. 3
11 PRESTON, op. cit. supra note 3, at *307 et seq.
121 W. BI. 672 (1769); HARGRAVES, 1 LAW TRACrS (1787) 498.
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words, which being the same in both cases ought to have the same
operation and construction."' 6
(4) Contingent Remainders Were Not Valid at the Time the Rule
Began.
Mr. Kales, in his book on Future Interests, points out that a re-
mainder to "heirs of A" would be a contingent remainder, for a living
person can have no heirs; and that at the time the Rule grew up, con-
tingent remainders were not recognized by the law. 7 Thus, if the
"heirs" were to take at all, they had to take by descent.
(5) Descent Was the Only Way Heirs Could Take Because of
Meaning of Word "Heirs".
Descent was the only way the heirs could take. "Heirs" means an
indefinite 'succession of persons, each of whom will succeed to land of
which his ancestor dies seised. There was no way known to the common
law in which such persons could take by purchase. The only estates that
could be held by more than one as purchasers were (1) joint tenancy
and (2) tenancy in common. The "heirs" could not take as joint tenants
because their estates would not arise at the same time; they could not
take as tenants in common because they could not be tenants at the same
time ;18 it follows that the only way the "heirs" could take would be by
descent.' 9 Thus, if the "heirs" were to take, it was necessary to have a
rule that would allow them to take by descent. This theory would not
explain the operation of the Rule where the remainder is to the heir
of A without a further assumption in respect to the meaning of heir in
the singular.
(6) The Policy of the Law to Keep the Distinction between Descent
and Purchase.
This theory assumes that the same policy is behind the Rule in
Shelley's Case as is behind the rule that a man cannot make his heirs
take by purchase when they would have taken by descent. By the Rule
in Shelley's Case, the law places the same barrier before acts of third
persons that it does before acts of the ancestor of the heir.20
(7) To Throw Land in Commrce a Generation Sooner.
Mr. Justice Blackstone advanced this theory in the famous case of
Perrin v. Blake. He contended that the Rule was originated to throw
land into commerce a generation sooner, and thereby subject it to debts
of the first taker. He rests his theory upon a case which he found in
1' I PRESTON, op. cit. supra note 3, at *299; WILLIAMs, REAL PROPERTY
(24th ed. 1926) 415.
'1 KALES, ESTATES FuTURE INTERESTS (2d ed. 1920) §35.
"
8In England at the time the Rule originated there could be but one heir at a
time though limitation is to the heirs of A.
a' GOODEW, REAL PROPERTY (5th ed. 1906) 222-225.
20 HARGRAVE, op. cit. supra note 15, at 552-578.
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the books, and which is curiously enough the earliest case on record
involving the principle of the Rule.21 In that case, A purchased Black-
acre, to hold to A and his wife and his eldest son, and if his son died
without'heirs of the body, then to the right heirs of A. The son died
without issue in his father's lifetime. A became heavily indebted. His
creditors reduced their claims to judgment and levied on A's land.
The sheriff returned his writ unsatisfied, stating that all the land of A
had been delivered up, except Blackacre, in which he only had a life
estate. In an action to decide the interest A had in Blackacre, the
court held that A had a fee.22
Sec. 4. Requisites of the Rule: From the practical standpoint, how-
ever, there are certain requisites that must exist before the Rule operates.
If they are present in a limitation, the Rule comes into play. There must
be (1) a prior estate of freehold in the ancestor;23 (2) there must be a
21Abel's Case, supra note 10. (Fearne points out Blackstone's and Hargrave's
reasons for Rule to apply only where the remainder is to heirs general of the
life tenant as estate tails were neither alienable nor subject to debts at that time.
1 FFARNE, op. cit. supra note 3, at 84 et seq.) (A died before the suit was
brought. It appears that the Court was of the opinion that A had a fee, but
the execution was not granted because the creditor had released A. However,
when the attorneys for the creditor asked that this execution cease forever,
Berrington, J., replied, "We shall not award that this execution cease." Most
of the argument dealt with warranty.)
"Whatever might have been the one reason for the adoption of the principle
embodied in the Rule, it seems that the main policy behind' the Rule was to keep
clearly defined the distinction which the common law had always drawn between
descent and purchase. One of the most effective ways the courts could accom-
plish this was to prevent by judicial decision the creation of, new types of estates
which would allow the grantees to take as purchasers without any of the obli-
gations of descent. Correspondingly, there was a strong policy to preserve the
nature of the estates which the law recognized at that time under the feudal
system. With the development of the concept of fee simple, life estate, remainder
and reversion, there grew up a rule of law that if a man gave away the entire
fee he could not restrict its alienation. The very nature of the fee was the right
to alienate it, and in order to preserve these rules of law intact, the judges, by
judicial decision, firmly established the rule that one could not transfer the entire
fee and restrict its alienation. Such a rule must have met the disfavor of certain
classes in the feudal days and they attempted to create means to dodge or eyade
the rule. A critical examination of a limitation to A for life remainder to
heirs of A irresistably leads to the conclusion that it is an' attempt to give A the
fee and restrict its alienation-for what other reason would a grantor have
in giving A the fee and restricting the alienation than to be assured that the fee
would pass to the heirs of A after A's death? The limitation in Shelley's Case
is a concrete example of an attempt of the owner of the fee to give out the
entire fee and at the same time to restrict its alienation. It is submitted that the
problem involved in the Rule in Shelley's Case is: Was the remainder given
to those who would take from A by the canons of descent in the same manner
as they would have taken by descent if conveyance had. not been made to them
by way of remainder? If the remainder was given to the heirs of A in the tech-
nical sense, it amounted to an evasion of the policy, that one cannot convey the
fee and at the same time restrict its alienation, a repugnancy which the law
did not allow at the time that the Rule in Shelley's Case grew up. In addition,
the common law judges must have reasoned, such a limitation would be a fraud
on the feudal lords, a thing contrary to public policy of that time. Besides, such
a remainder would be a contingent remainder and void.
"' The estate of freehold in the-ancestor may be by resulting use.
(Vol. 20
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remainder to the heirs general or special of the first taker; (3) the
estate to the ancestor and the remainder to his heirs must be limited
under the same instrument; and (4) both estates must be either legal or
equitable.24
PART II. CHARACTER Or THE RULE AND THE INTENT
OF THE TESTATOR
Sec. 5. Character of the Rule: The Rule operates on the remainder.
Once it has been determined that the ancestor has a freehold estate,
attention should then be directed to the remainder. The precise problem
is-has a remainder been limited to the heirs or heirs of the body of
the first taker? Heirs in the technical sense means a group of people
who are to take in inheritable succession from the ancestor, generation
after generation. 5 At this point, the problem is one of construction
of the remainder. If the words in the remainder are used in their
technical sense, the Rule applies, irrespective of the intent of the testa-
tor or grantor to give the ancestor only a life estate.
Our Court has apparently often forgotten this important point.
Time and again, it has done verbal homage to the well-settled proposi-
tion that the Rule is a rule of law and operates irrespective of the testa-
tor's intention26 only to turn upon itself and toy about unduly with the
testator's intention. It is well settled that technical words or words of
known technical import must have their technical effect even though the
testator uses inconsistent words, unless the words in conflict make it
perfectly clear that the testator did not mean to use the technical words
in their proper sense.
Sec. 6. The Intent of the Testator: The Rule in Shelley's Case is a
rule of law that operates irrespective of the intent of the testator.27
Accordingly, once it has been determined that there is a remainder to
the heirs or heirs of the body (in the technical sense) of the taker of
the freehold estate, the Rule applies although the testator expressly
stated that it should not or that the first taker was to have only a life
estate.2 8 However, the application of this simple principle, to limita-
tions in wills particularly, has led to much confusion, due chiefly to
the so-called doctrine of general intent, that is, the intent of the testator
24 CHALLIs, op. cit. supra note 8, at 153.
"' Allen v. Pass, 20 N. C. 207 (1838).
"Edgerton v. Aycock, 123 N. C. 134, 31 S. E. 382 (1898) ; Martin v. Knowles,
195 N. C. 427, 142 S. E. 313 (1928).
27 For a full discussion of the intent of the testator, see 1 FEARNE, op. cit.
supra note 3, at *154-*178; 1 PRESTON, op. cit. supra note 3, at *272-*279; 1 HAYES,
INTRODUCTioN TO CONVEYANCING (4th ed. 1839) 418-427; Nichols v. Gladden, 117
N. C. 497, 23 S. E. 459 (1895); Edgerton v. Aycock, 123 N. C. 134, 31 S. E.
382 (1898); Martin v. Knowles, 195 N. C. 425, 142 S. E. 313 (1928).
"Roe v. Grew, 2 Wils. K. B. 322, 95 Eng. Rep. 835 (C. B. 1766); Note
(1910) 10 CoL. L. REV. 62.
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as gathered from the instrument as a whole prevails over any particular
expressed intent.
This doctrine seems to have its origin in Roe v. Grew,2 9 a rather
simple case for the application of the Rule. In Roe v. Grew, there was
a devise to A (nephew of testator) for life, and after his death to the
issue of his body, and the heirs of the body of such issue. It was held
that A had an estate tail. In reaching this decision, however, Lord
Chief Justice Wilmot said, "The intention of the testator clearly was.
to give A an estate for life only, but his intention also clearly was that
the sons of A should take in succession. Both these intentions cannot
take place, for if the devisee A took only an estate for life, his son
could never have taken-The Court must put themselves in the place
of testator, and determine as he would have done if he had been told
that both of his intentions in the will, by the rules of law, could not
take place, and had been asked which of them he desired should take
effect and stand. He certainly would have answered that 'so long as
A had any issue male the premises should not go to the lessor of the
plaintiff', and if we balance the two intentions, A must be adjudged to
have been tenant in tail."3 0  But it doesn't seem that such language
was necessary for the decision of the case. Yet the doctrine was ap-
proved in 1820 by Lord Elden, in Jesson v. Wright, 1 and appeared
to be alive in England as late as 1844.
The doctrine of general intent met its death in England thirteen
years later in the leading case of Van Grutten v. Foxwell.82  As to
the doctrine, Lord Herschell said, "I think the introduction of the
notion of a 'general intent' and a 'particular intent' on the part of the
testator, the latter intent yielding to the former, tended to put matters on
the wrong track, and suggest that the estate the devisee took depended
after all on the intention of the testator, and not on the effect which
the law gave to a devise in particular terms."83 In North Carolina, the
doctrine of general intent has had a checkered career. As early as
1833, the Court announced the doctrine of general and particular in-
tent.34 But in Nichols v. Gladden,35 Montgomery, J., ably and firmly
stated that the Rule was a rule of law and was not to be construed
according to the general intent of the testator. However, in 1833, the
" 2 Wils. K. B. 322, 95 Eng. Rep. 835 (C. B. 1766).
'0 The famous case of Perrir- v. Blake, which involved squarely the effect of
the intent of the testator on the Rule, was never carried to a final decision.
However, it caused much discussion at the bar and among text writers. For a
full discussion of the case, see 1 FEARNE, op. cit. supra note 3, at *155-*156; 1
PRESTON, op. cit. supra note 3, at *271.
312 Bligh. 1 (1820). But in the same case the doctrine was attacked strongly
by Lord Redsdale. " [1897] A. C. 658, 663 (Eng.).
"Van Grutten v. Foxwell, [1897] A. C. 658, 663 (Eng.).
"Ross v. Toms, 15 N. C. 376 (1833).
"117 N. C. 497, 23 S. E. 459 (1895).
(Vol. 20
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Court had announced the doctrine of general and particular intent.3 6
Consequently, many years later, in tampton v. Griggs,7 the Court
apparently attempted to reconcile the doctrine of general, intent with
the Gladden case. After stating that the Rule in Shelley's Case was a
rule of law, Stacy, J., said, "The meaning or sense in which the words
'heirs' or 'heirs of the body' are employed, whether technical or other,
is denominated the general or paramount intent, and this is to be the
controlling factor. As against this dominant purpose the lesser or
particular intent must give way; for having once determined that the
second devise was intended to be given to the heirs of the first taker
qua heirs, or in the strict and technical sense of heirs, the rule is in-
exorable."3 8  It is submitted that such language only confused matters.
It would be better to disregard entirely the talk of general and particular
intent. In the late case of Martin v. Knowles,39 the Court quoted Mr.
Hayes at length. It is hoped that this will be the death blow to the
doctrine of general and particular intent in North Carolina.40
PART III. NORTH CAROLINA STATUTES
Sec. 7. There are several statutes which may affect the application
of the Rule.
1. Fee Tail Converted into Fee Simple:
"Every person seised of an estate in tail shall be deemed to be seised
of the same in fee simple; and all sales and conveyances, made bona
fide and for valuable consideration since the first day of January 1777
by any tenant in tail in actual possession of any real estate where such
estate has been conveyed in fee simple, shall be good and effectual in
law to bar any tenant in tail and in remainder of and from all claim,
action, and right of entry whatsoever, of, in, and to such entailed estate,
against any purchaser, his heirs, or assigns, now in actual possession of
such estate, in the same manner as if such tenant in tail had possessed
the same in fee simple."1
41
This statute does not prevent the Rule from operating.
42
2. Heirs Construed as Children:
"A limitation by deed, will, or other writing, to the heirs of a living
person, shall be construed to be the children of such person, unless a con-
trary intention appear by the deed or will." 43
" Blackledge v. Simmons, 180 N. C. 535, 105 S. E. 202 (1920); Crisp v.
Briggs, 176 N. C. 1, 96 S. E. 662 (1918). But see, Crawford v. Wearn, 115
N. C. 540, 541, 20 S. E. 724, 725 (1894); and Ward v. Jones, 40 N. C. 400(1848).37184 N. C. 13, 113 S. E. 501 (1922). See Sec. 22(a) infra.
11 Hampton v. Griggs, 184 N. C. 13, 17, 113 S. E. 501, 502 (1922Y.
"195 N. C. 427, 142 S. E. 313 (1928).
"1 HAYES, op. cit. supra note 27, at 418.
'IN. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §1734.
"Nichols v. Gladden, 117 N. C. 497, 23 S. E. 459 (1895). See Note (1922)
1 N. C. L. Rar. 110 (criticism). "1 N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §1739.
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This statute does not prevent the Rule from operating. It applies only
when there is no preceding estate conveyed to a living person.4 4
3. Limitations and Failure of Issue:
"Every contingent limitation in any deed or will, made to depend
upon the dying of any person without heir or heirs of the body, or with-
out issue or issues of the body, or without children, or offspring, de-
scendants, or other relative, shall be held and interpreted a limitation to
take effect when such person dies not having such heir, or issue, or
child, or offspring, or descendant, or other relative, (as the case may be)
living at the time of his death, or born to him within ten lunar months
thereafter, unless the intention of such limitations be otherwise, and
expressly and plainly declared in the face of the deed or will creating it:
Provided, that the rule of construction contained in this section shall not
extend to any deed or will made and executed before the 15 of January,
1828."45
This statute does not prevent the Rule from operating. Again the pur-
pose of the statute was to make a contingent limitation good. It fixes
a definite time when the estate to the first taker shall become absolute.40
4. Fee Presumed though Heirs Omitted:
"When real estate is conveyed to any person, the same shall be held
and construed to be a conveyance in fee, whether the word 'heir' is used
or not, unless such conveyance in plain and express words shows, or it is
plainly intended by conveyance or some part thereof, that the grantor
meant to convey an estate of less dignity. ' '47
This statute does not prevent the Rule from operating.
Sec. 8. Slave Cases: See footnote-Personal Property.4"
PART IV. OF THE ESTATE IN THE ANCESTOR
Sec. 9. Freehold in the Ancestor: There must be a freehold estate in
the ancestor. It may be expressed, or implied by way of resulting use.4 9
Without a freehold in the ancestor the rule does not apply; it is a
"" Starnes v. Hill, 112 N. C. 1, 16 S. E. 1011 (1893) ; Hartman v. Flynn, 189
N. C. 452, 127 S. E. 515 (1925).
"N. C. CoD- ANx. (Michie, 1939) §1737.
"King v. Utley, 85 N. C. 59 (1881); Sanderlin v. Deford, 47 N. C. 75(1854).
"N. C. CoDE AN. (Michie, 1939) §991.
,Note of Rule in Shelley's Case and Personal Property. The rule does not
apply to personal property. Crawford v. Wearn, 115 N. C. 540, 20 S. E. 724
(1894). Note (1909) 27 HAtv. L. RLT. 53. However, prior to the abolition of
slavery, the Rule applied to deeds and devises of slaves. Chambers v. Payne, 59
N. C. 276 (1862); Williams v. Houston, 57 N. C. 277 (1858); Boyd v. Small,
56 N. C. 39 (1856) ; Hodges v. Little, 52 N. C. 145 (1859) ; Sanderlin v. Deford,
47 N. C. 75 (1854); Coon v. Rice, 29 N. C. 217 (1847); Ham v. Ham, 21
N. C. 598 (1837); Allen v. Pass, 20 N. C. 207 (1838); Nichols v. Cartwright,
6 N. C. 137 (1812) ; Cutlar v. Cutlar, 3 N. Ck 154 (1801).
"' Brown v. Gutherie, 190 N. C. 822, 130 S. E. 836 (1925).
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necessary requisite. 5o It does not matter that the limitation is to A for
life "only". 51
Sec. 9 (a). Where the Freehold Is in the Ancestor as Tenant in
Common: The life tenants may be tenants in common 52 with a remainder
to their respective heirs. If the remainder is to the heirs of only one
of the life tenants, the Rule will operate as to his moiety. Our court
has so held.53 If a freehold is left to life tenants as tenants in common,
with remainders to the heirs of the body of the life tenants, it is not
necessary that the life tenants be capable of having children or are
able to marry each other. The rule will operate to give each an estate
tail as to an undivided half which will be changed into fee simple by
statute.54
Sec. 9 (b). Where a Freehold Is in the Ancestors Jointly: If a free-
hold is limited to two or more people jointly, with remainder to their
"heirs", the Rule operates where (1) "heirs" means heirs of one of the
tenants, or (2) if the joint life tenants are capable of having a common
heir, or (3) where "heirs" means heirs of two between them begotten. 55
And so if land is devised to A, B, and C, jointly, and then to their
respective heirs, executors and administrators, the English Courts have
held that the Rule does not operate; that A, B, and C were joint tenants
for their lives and the lives.of the survivor with several remainders in
tenancy in common in fee.58 The English Court said the word "re-
spective" before the word "heir" prevented the Rule from operating. 57
However, where there is a devise to several children of the testator as
joint tenants for life, with remainder to the heirs at law of the joint
tenants, it was held by our court, in Walker v. Taylor,8 that the Rule
operates to give the joint tenants for life the fee jointly. Our court
pointed out that A, B, and C, the joint life tenants, were capable of
having a common heir.
Walker v. Taylor was followed in Bagwell v. Hines,59 where there
was a deed to A and B for their joint lives, with remainder in fee
"' See Sec. 3 supra: Reasons for the Rule. Wolfe v. Shelley, 1 Co. 93b,
104a; Co. LiTr. *319; CHAU.is, op. cit. supra note 8, at 153; 1 FEARNE, Op. Cit.
supra note 3, at *28; 1 ParSoN, op. cit. supra note 3, at *266.
"Merchants National Bank v. Dortch, 186 N. C. 510, 120 S. E. 60 (1923).
"1 PRE TON, op. cit. supra note 3, at *313.
"McSwain v. Washburn, 170 N. C. 363, 87 S. E. 97 (1915).
Cahoon v. Upton, 174 N. C. 88, 93 S. E. 446 (1917).
1 FEARxE, op. cit. supra note 3, at *36.
"Wilson v. Atkinson (1892) 3 Ch. I (Eng.) ; Note (1893) 6 HARv. L. REV.
321.
57Cf. Ex parle Tanner, 20 Beav. 374, 52 Eng. Rep. 647 (Ch. 1855) (where
limitation was to A and B and the heirs of their bodies respectively, the Rule
operated).
s 144 N. C. 175, 56 S. E. 877 (1907).
' 187 N. C. 690, 122 S. E. 659 (1924). But if the limitation of the freehold
is not joint, but successive, the Rule should not operate. 1 FARNE, op. cit. supra
note 3, at *35; 1 PRSTON, op. cit. supra note 3, at *314.
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to heirs of A and B. (A and B were evidently brothers and sisters.)
Fearne contends that if the joint life tenants are incapable of marriage,
they should take several estates of inheritance though the freehold is
in them jointly.60
The Rule applies where there is an estate by the entirety for life
in the first takers, remainder to the heirs or the heirs of the body of
the life tenants.68
The possibility of part of the joint freehold terminating during the
life of one of the ancestors does not prevent the Rule from operating. 2
In Cotton v. Mosely, 63 the limitation was to A and his wife, B, for
their lives, and "afterwards to B's heirs forever". If A predeceased
B his estate would terminate before the remainder could possibly have
vested in possession, but the Rule would apply just the same.04 Sup-
pose the limitation is to A and B jointly, remainder to right heirs of him
that tiieth first. It seems the Rule would apply, theoretically. The
court in Cotto; v. Mosely, said that the fact that the remainder will or
cannot possibly vest in the lifetime of the ancestor will not exclude the
Rule. However, in the suggested case, as Mr. Preston points out,05
the inheritance will not vest, for the ancestor must die, terminating his
freehold estate, before it is certain that he in particular is the person
to whose heirs the limitation is made. Such gifts over are governed
by the rules respecting contingent remainders and these rules prevent
the vesting of the inheritance in the hypothetical case.
If the limitation is to A and his wife B (or to anyone capable of
issue by the laws of marriage), with remainders to the heirs of their
bodies, the Rule operates to give an estate tail in the ancestors jointly, 0
which is converted into a fee simple by our Statute.
Sec. 9 (c). Where the Freehold in Ancestor Is by Way of
Remainder: If the ancestor's freehold is limited by way of vested
remainder, the Rule should operate at once to give him a fee or fee
tail in remainder. Our Court has so held in Wool v. Fleetwood.°"
There would seem to be no doubt on this point; however, the New
York court 68 seemed to indicate, in Spader v. Powers0 9 that a vested
01 FEARNE, op. cit. supra note 3, at *36.
Davis v. Bass, 188 N. C. 200, 124 S. E. 566 (1924); Robertson v. Griffin,
185 N. C. 38, 115 S. E. 824 (1923).621 FEAIRNE op. cit. supra note 3, at *30.
63 159 N. C. 1, 74 S. E. 454 (1912).
"Cf. 1 FEARNE, op. cit. supra note 3, at *36; 1 PREsToN, op. cit. supra
note 3, at *338.
651 PREsToN, op. cit. supra note 3, at *315-*319; 1 FEARNE, op. cit. supra note 3,
at *32.
"' Cohoon v. Upton, 174 N. C. 88, 93 S. E. 446 (1917); 1 FEARNE, op. cit.
supra note 3, at *35.
67 136 N. C. 460, 48 S. E. 785 (1904).
'IThe Rule is now abolished in New York.
" 50 Hun 153 (N. Y. 1889).
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remainder in the ancestor had to be vested in possession or the Rule
would not apply. In that case there was a devise to A for life, at
A's death to B, and should B predecease A, then to B's heirs. B did
predecease A. The New York court held B's heirs took by purchase
under the will and not by descent. 70 In Wool v. Fleetwood, there was
a devise to A for life, and after his death to B for life, and after
his death "to vest in B's lawful heirs." The Supreme Court of North
Carolina held that B took a vested remainder in fee. It is submitted
that the rule in the Fleetwood case is the sounder of the two.
The fact that the ancestor's estate is limited by way of contingent
remainder does not prevent the Rule from operating when the remainder
in the ancestor vests. As long as the remainder in the ancestor is
contingent, however, the Rule does not operate, 71 for the arcestor does
not then have an estate of freehold. In the leading case of Starnes v..
Hill,72 there was a deed of Blackacre in special trust to:A for life, and
in event B (husband of A) outlived A, then to B for life, and then to
the heirs of the said B, them and their heirs forever. A and B and the
trustees conveyed Blackacre to one Y, who sold it to plaintiff. The
plaintiff contracted to sell to defendant. A and B were living at the
time of suit. The court held: (1) that B had a contingent remainder,
and if he does not outlive A, his heirs take by purchase; (2) if B
outlives A, his remainder vests and the Rule applies to give him the
fee. The court seems clearly wrong in holding that B had a contingent
remainder. It is a well-settled rule that the mere addition of words
of contingency, which do not add anything to the very nature of the
remainder, do not make a remainder contingent. In the limitation in
question, to A for life, and in event B outlived A, then to B for life,
there is in substance a limitation to A for life, remainder to B for life,
for the only way B could ever take a life estate in possession where
there is a preceding life tenant would be to outlive the preceding life
tenant. The words "in event B outlived A" add no contingency to
the nature of the remainder that is not always implied in such limitation
by its very nature. That a limitation to A for life, then to B for life
(a living person) gives B a vested remainder is a self-evident proposi-
tion. Such in substance was the limitation in Starnes v. Hill. Per-
haps the court's interest in the Rule in Shelley's Case caused it to over-
look this point, which was all important to the proper solution of the
case.
Sec. 9 (d). The Ancestor's Estate May Terminate-in Lifetime of
Ancestor: The fact that the ancestor's freehold may terminate in the
7o Note (1910) 24 HARV. L. REV. 160.
71 1 PRESToN, op. cit. supra note 3, at *316.
72 112 N. C. 1, 16 S. E. 1011 (1893).
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lifetime of the ancestor does not prevent the Rule from operating. If
there is an estate in A for the life of B, or to A during her widowhood,
with remainder to the heirs or the heirs of the body of A, the Rule
operates, 73 for all the Rule requires is that the ancestor take a free-
hold and that by the same conveyance a remainder is limited to his
heirs. There is no North Carolina case directly in point, but it is sub-
mitted that our court should follow the rule stated above7 4
Sec. 9 (e). Where Ancestor Has a Life Estate as Trustee, Taking
No Beneficial Interest Therein: If an estate is limited to A for life as
trustee, with remainder to the heirs or the heirs of the body of A, there
is some doubt that the Rule applies. Mr. Fearne75 thinks the Rule has
no application. Mr. Preston," however, thinks that the Rule should
apply, contending that a declaration of trust annexed to the freehold
of the ancestor does not make any difference. There is no North Caro-
lina case in point.77
Sec. 9 (f). Where There Are Intervening Life Estates: It is well
settled that intervening life estates, vested or contingent, do not prevent
the operation of the Rule7 8  Our court so held in Hartman v. Flynn.19
The Rule operates on the remainder independent of the doctrine of
merger. Sgme contend that the freehold and the remainder unite in
the ancestor subject to opening and letting in intervening life estates
as they vest in possession,80 while others advance the theory that where
life estates are interposed, the remainder and the freehold do not unite
until the intermediate life estates have expired or lost possibility of vest-
ing in possession. The result is the same in both cases.
PART V. OF THE REMAINDER
Sec. 10. In General: There must be a remainder by the same instru-
ment that creates a freehold in the ancestor. It may be limited either to
the heirs general or special of the first taker.8 '
Sec. 11. Where the Remainder Is to Heirs of the Ancestor: A typi-
cal case for the application of the Rule is a limitation to A for life
1' 1 PRESTON, op. cit. supra note 3, at *313.
"'See Cotton v. Mosely, 159 N. C. 1, 74 S. E. 454 (1912). See Sec. 9(b)
supra.
" 1 FEARNE, op. cit. supra note 3, at *39.
" 1 PRESTON, op. cit. supra note 3, at *311.
See discussion Sec. 18 infra: Executory Trnsts.
78 CHALLIS, op. cit. suprd note 8, at 163; 1 FEAtNE, op. cit. supra note 3, at
*37; 1 PRESTON, op. cit. supra note 3, at *266.
7 189 N. C. 452, 127 S. E. 517 (1925).
" 1 FEARNE, op. cit. supra note 3, at *34.8 Barns v. Best, 196 N. C. 668, 146 S. E. 710 (1929); Daniel v. Bass, 193
N. C. 294, 136 S. E. 733 (1927) ;. Wills v. Mutual Loan & Trust Co., 183 N. C.
267, 111 S. E, 163 (1922) ; Weatherly v. Armnfield, 30 N. C. 25 (1847) ; Hollo-
well v. Karnegay, 29 N. C. 261 (1847); CHALLIS, op. cit. supra note 8, at 163;
1 FEARNE, op. cit. supra note 3, at *28; 1 PRESTON, op. cit. supra note 2, at *263.
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remainder to heirs of A.82 If the word "heirs" is used other than in
its technical sense, i.e., as an indefinite group of people to succeed by
descent from generation to generation, the Rule does not apply.83 How-
ever, the word "forever" added to heirs in the remainder does not pre-
vent the Rule from operating.8 4 And so, if the remainder is to the heirs
of A, "their only use and behoof," the Rule operates. 85 The addition
of such words as "lawful ''80 or "surviving" 87 or "nearest"88 to heirs
of A in the remainder will not prevent the Rule from operating. How-
ever, if the remainder is to the heirs of A and one or some of the possible
heirs are expressly eliminated, the Rule will not apply. In Watkins v.
Flora,8 9 the remainder was limited to A's heirs by consanguinity, with
exception of one sister, B. The court properly held that the Rule did
not apply, for since the course of descent cannot thus be altered by ad-
mitting some and excluding others, the heirs take by purchase in the
remainder.
Sec. 12. Implied Remainders in the Heir: Where a life estate is
given to A and a limitation to B on failure of heirs or heirs of the
body of A, the question of whether or not a remainder will be implied
to heirs of A presents itself. In England it seems that a remainder will
be implied to the heirs of the life tenant and the Rule in Shelley's Case
will operate.90 Georgia follows the English courts.9 1
This point has never been directly presented to our courts. How-
ever, in Pugh v. Allen 9 2 there was a deed of Blackacre to A, his heirs
and assigns on certain conditions, and in further consideration that in
case A should die without heir, the gift shall go to B, his heirs and as-
signs. The case holds that in such a situation to die without heir means
to die without issue. From this case, it might be argued that in North
82 Curry v. Curry, 183 N. C. 83, 110 S. E. 579 (1922) ; see Wills v. Mutual
Loan & Trust Co., 183 N. C. 267, 111 S. E. 163 (1922); Allen v. Hewitt, 212
N. C. 367, 193 S. E. 275 (1937). Where there is a remainder to the heirs of
the first taker, the addition of such words as "to such collateral relations as may
be entitled to the same upon the failure of issue!' are treated by our court as
surplusage. Rowland v. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n., 211 N. C. 456, 190 S. E.
719 (1937).8 Wilkinson v. Boyd, 136 N. C. 46, 48 S. E. 516 (1904); Hauser v. Craft,
134 N. C. 319, 46 S. E. 756 (1902).8
'Waddel v. Aycock, 195 N. C. 268, 142 S. E. 10 (1928); King v. Utley,
85 N. C. 59 (1881).82 Starling v. Newsom, 180 N. C. 440, 105 S. E. 3 (1920).
80 Wool v. Fleetwood, 136 N. C. 460, 48 S. E. 785 (1904).
87 Price v. Griffin, 150 N. C. 523, 64 S. E. 372 (1909).
88 Crisp v. Briggs, 176 N. C. 1, 96 S. E. 662 (1918).
80 30 N. C. 374 (1848).
0o Lethieulier v. Tracy, 1 Keny. 56, 96 Eng. Rep. 914 (Ch. 1754).
"I Burton v. Black, 30 Ga. 638 (1860). Closely associated with this doctrine
of a remainder implied in the heirs of the first taker is the principle of increasing
a life estate by implication. It seems that the weight of authority is that an
express life estate may be increased by implication. See note: (1911) 29 L.
R. A. (N. S.) 1011.
-179 N. C. 307, 102 S. E. 394 (1920).
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Carolina there would be no remainder implied in the heirs of the first
taker, in a limitation to A for life, then to B on failure of the heirs or
the heirs of the body of A, and therefore the Rule would not apply in
such a limitation.
It is interesting to note that in Pugh v. Allen, the life estate was to
a son of the grantor, and the gift over if he should die without an
heir was to another son of the grantor in fee. In the Allen case, our
court applied the rule of Rollins v. Keel;93 that is, where the ultimate
taker is presumptively or potentially one of the heirs general of the
first taker, the term dying without heir or heirs on part of the primary
grantee will be construed to mean his issue in the sense of children and
grandchildren living at his death and not heirs general. From the
reasoning of that case, a general rule to the effect that there will be no
implication of remainders in heirs of the first taker might be stating
the proposition too broadly. For example, if the gift over was to a
stranger of the blood of the first taker, or if it was to take effect on
failure of heirs of the body of A, the reason given in Pugh v. Allen
for not implying a remainder to heirs of life tenant, namely, that if it
was so implied the limitation over to B would be in vain, ceases to exist.
Sec. 13. Remainder to Heirs of Body of Life Tenant: The Rule ap-
plies where the remainder, under the proper circumstances, is limited
to the heirs of the body of the taker of the particular estate. 4 The
Rule operates in this situation to carry the remainder to the ancestor,
and if there are no intervening estates, to give him an immediate estate
in tail general, tail special, male or female, depending upon the limita-
tion. Estate tail has been abolished in North Carolina by statute,0 5
but that does not prevent the Rule from operating.90 The Statute con-
verts what would have been an estate tail into an estate in fee in the
first taker.
The words "bodily heirs" in the remainder have the same meaning
as heirs of the body.9 7 The Rule applies though the limitation in the
remainder is to the heirs of the body "only" 98 or to their "only use and
behoof,"' 9 or to the heirs of the body of A and to B for life,100 no
other limitation or gift over following. Likewise, a remainder to the
heirs or heiresses of the body of the life tenant does not prevent the
Rule from operating. Leathers v. Gray, deciding this last proposition,
"115 N. C. 68, 20 S. E. 209 (1894). .
,Bradley v. Church, 195 N. C. 662, 143 S. E. 211 (1928) ; Perry v. Hackney,
142 N. C. 368, 55 S. E. 289 (1906).
"N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1939) c. 34, §1734. See §7 supra.
"See sec. 7 supra.
"'Chamblee v. Broughton, 120 N. C. 170, 27 S. E. 111 (1897).
" Foley v. Ivey, 193 N. C. 453, 137 S. E. 418 (1927).
" Starling v. Newsom, 180 N. C. 440, 105 S. E. 3 (1920).
"' Daniel v. Harrison, 175 N. C. 120, 95 S. E. 37 (1918).
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first came up in 1887.101 And the court held that the Rule did not apply
on the ground that the addition of word "heiresses" showed that
"heirs" was not used in its technical sense. On the rehearing'"2 the
court reversed itself. The court there said, "super-added words, to
have such an effect, must have appropriate pertinency in meaning and
bearing . . . the course of descent is not changed in any degree- from
what it would have been if the word 'heiresses' did not appear, nor
does the word suggest or imply children of the testator any more than
does the word 'heirs'.' 10 3
Sec. 14. Reminder to Others than Heirs or the Heirs of the Body:
Sec. 14 (a). Reminder to the Issue of the First Taker: If the re-
mainder is limited to the issue of the life tenant, the Rule does not
ap~ly unless it manifestly appears that "issue" is used as heirs gen-
eral.' 04 Since the word "heirs" is no longer needed to pass the fee in
North Carolina,' 05 this rule seems sound in spite of the common law
rule that in devises "issue" is generally treated to embrace descendants
of all degrees.106 The reason common law judges construed "issue"
to include heirs general was to carry the inheritance to the issue by
descent, for if the issue took by purchase they would take only a life
estate. Even in the absence of a statute abolishing the necessity of the
word "heirs" to pass the fee, if words of limitation were added to
"issue", then "issue" would be construed as a word of purchase.1 7
In North Carolina, if the remainder is to the bodily issue of the life
tenant, the Rule does not apply.'08 In coming to this conclusion the
court was justified by former holdings and on general principles, but the
decision seems to place entirely too much emphasis on the estate the
testator intended to give the first taker; the approach should be by
way of the remainder. If the remainder is limited to the heirs or the
heirs of the body of the life tenant qua heirs, though those exact words
are not used, the Rule should apply.
Sec. 14 (b). Where the Renmainder Is to "Children", Etc.: If the
remainder is limited to any other than the heirs or the heirs of the
body of the life tenant, the limitation is out of the Rule. And'so, where
the remainder is limited to the children of the life tenant, the Rule
"' Leathers v. Gray, 96 N. C. 548, 2 S. E. 455 (1887).
... Leathers v. Gray, 101 N. C. 162, 7 S. E. 657 (1888).
103 Id. at 166, 7 S. E. at 659 (1888).
"0 Faison v. Odam, 144 N. C. 107, 56 S. E. 793 (1907).
10' See sec. 7 supra.
10"In re Cust [1919] Vict. L. R. 693 (Australia); notes (1920) 33 HARV.
L. REv. 988; (1916)1 30 HAgv. L. REv. 195.
.
7
. In the common law of England, the word "issue" presumptively has the
meaning of "heirs". In a remainder limited to the issue of' the life tenant
for the purpose of the Rule, "issue" has the effect of "heirs" unless it appears
to be used to designate particular individuals. CHALLIS, op. cit. supra note 8, at
164; SMITH, EXECuTORy INTERESTS (1845) 248.
100 Ford v. McBrayer, 171 N. C. 420, 88 S. E. 736 (1916).
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does not apply, 10 9 unless it clearly appears that the word "children"
was used in the sense of "heirs"."10
In Hathaway v. Harris,111 the testator devised land to A (his son)
for life, and if he should die with lawful child, then to him and his heirs
forever; but if he should die without lawful child, gift over to his
widow for life, then to B and his heirs. It was held that the Rule
applied. The court pointed out that in its opinion the words "then to him
and his heirs" refer to A; that in every other part of the entire clause
(except the concluding words), where the pronouns "he" and "his" were
used, the reference is plainly to his son, A, and must be so understood.
The court held that the limitation should be treated as if it read as fol-
lows: If he (A) should die with a lawful child, then to him (A) and
his (A's) heirs forever, but if he should die without a lawful child,
then to his (A's) widow. This, our court holds, plainly indicates that
the testator's mind was focussed on his son.
If Hathaway v. Harris were before the court today for the first
time and the limitation should be construed in the same manner, it is
arguable that the Rule would not apply because the ultimate gift over
was not to the heirs general of A. It is not clear from the case whether
B was one of the potential heirs of A or whether he was a stranger to
the blood of A. If B was one of the potential heirs of A, then the
Rule would not apply under the doctrine of Puckett v. Morgan.1" 2
However, if B happened to be a stranger to the blood of A, it seems
that in spite of Puckett v. Morgan the Rule would operate. Williams
v. R. R. 11 seems to be authority for this statement, but the point is not
strongly established in the Williams case, for it may be explained away
on another point. 114 . However, it was not suggested at the time of
Hathaway v. Harris (1881) that any type of gift over took the limita-
tion out of the Rule in Shelley's Case.
If the remainder is limited to the "nearest blood relatives" of the
holder of the particular estate, the Rule does not apply.11 But if the
remainder is to the "legal representatives" of the first taker, the Rule
applies. 116 In Nobles v. Nobles, Blackacre was devised to A for life,
remainder to his legal representatives. The court properly focussed its
attention on the nature of the remainder and concluded that in such a
limitation legal representatives conveyed an estate to the heirs of the
00 Hutton & Bourbonnais Co. v. Horton, 178 N. C. 548, 101 S. E. 279 (1919);
Smith v. Moore, 178 N. C. 370, 100 S. E. 702 (1919).
110 See Jones v. Whichard, 163 N. C. 241, 79 S. E. 503 (1913) ; notes (1920)
33 HARv. L. REv. 988; (1896) 10 H~av. L. REv. 66.12184 N. C. 96 (1881).
12158 N. C. 344, 74 S. E. 15 (1912).
l200 N. C. 771, 158 S. E. 473 (1931).
1 See §23(g) infra.
12 Miller v. Harding, 167 N. C. 53, 83 S. E. 25 (1914).
110 Nobles v. Nobles, 177 N. C. 243, 98 S. E. 715 (1919).
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first taker as a class to take in succession from generation to genera-
tion.117 There is no case in North Carolina where the remainder was
limited to the descendants of the first taker, but in light of the decided
cases, it is submitted that descentants would be construed as heirs. 118
Sec. 14 (c). Remainder to the Heirs by Springing Use: If the re-
mainder is limited to the heirs by way of springing use, the Rule does
not apply. This follows from the nature of the Rule and the requisites
necessary to bring it into operation.1 19 There is no North Carolina
case in point.
See. 15. Remainder to Heirs or the Heirs of the Body by the Pres-
ent Husband or Wife: In the case of Morehead v. Montague, it was
decided that if the remainder is to the heirs or the heirs of the body of
the life tenant by her husband, the Rule applies. 120 This case expressly
overrules Dawson v. Quinerly,'21 and Thompson v. Crump,12 2 which
held that the Rule did not apply in similar situations. Mr. Fearne said
that the Rule applies where the remainder is to heirs of A begotten by
B, her husband.123 Some of the early English cases distinguished be-
tween limitations to the heirs of A begotten "by her husband" and the
heirs of A begotten "on" the body of B, holding that the Rule applied
in the former and not in the latter.'2 4 But since Morehead v. Montague,
it does not seem that this distinction would be drawn in North Carolina,
for the limitation in Dawson v. Quinnerly was to A for life, then to
the heirs of A begotten on the body of A by her present husband. As
stated above, this case has been expressly overruled. However, if A
and B are both of the same sex or cannot marry, the limitation is read
to be to their heirs respectively.
Sec. 16. Remainder in the Heirs on Contingent Event: If the re-
mainder to the heirs or the heirs of the body of the first taker is con-
tingent upon the happening of some event, the Rule operates to give
the ancestor a contingent remainder. When the event happens, the
remainder becomes a vested remainder in the ancestor, and if there are
... For an early definition of "heir", see Ward v. Stowe, 17 N. C. 509 at
512 (1834).18 It has been so construed in Pennsylvania, Burkley v. Burkley, 266 Pa. 338,
109 Ati. 687 (1920).
"10 1 PREsTON, op. cit. supra note 3, at *324. See §4 supra.
1 "oMorehead v. Montague, 200 N. C. 497, 157 S. E. 793 (1931). Sessoms
v. Sessoms, 144 N. C. 121, 56 S. E. 687 (1897), cited by the court as authority
for its position,, is not necessarily authority for a case dealing with the Rule in
S ielley's Case. In the Sessorns case, the limitation was to A and lawful heirs of
his body forever, if he should die without such lawful heirs, gift over to B.
Cf. Thompson v. Crump, 138 N. C. 32, 50 S. E. 457 (1905); Bird v. Gilliam,
121 N. C. 326, 28 S. E. 489 (1897).
z21 118 N. C. 188, 24 S. E. 483 (1896).
122 138 N. C. 32, 50 S. E. 457 (1905).
'2 1 FEARNE, op. cit. supra note 3, at *31.
"' 1 FEARNE, op. cit. supra note 3, at *31.
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no intervening life estates, the then vested remainder in the ancestor
unites with the life estate to give him the fee. If the event does not
happen in the lifetime of the ancestor, the contingent remainder in him
passes to his heirs by descent.125
Sec. 17. The Effect on the Remainder of the First Taker Prede-
ceasing the Devisor: Where the devisee of the particular estate prede-
ceases the testator, the problem of whether or not the heirs in the
remainder can take as purchasers arises.1 26 For example, a devise to
A for life, remainder to B for life, remainder to heirs of A. A prede-
ceases the testator. Since a will is ambulatory, why may not the heirs
of A take as purchasers? The problem has not been presented to our
courts. Mr. Preston, in his essay on the Rule, raised this problem. 12 7
Under the heading, he cited Brett v. Rigden,128 which does not involve
the Rule but raises an analogous problem. There the devise was to A
and his heirs. A predeceases the testator; the heir of A claimed under
the will. In both Brett v. Rigden and the case suggested, if A had out-
lived the testator he would have had a fee. The court, in Brett v.
Rigden, held that the heir of A took nothing under the will. But that
case does not seem to decide the problem suggested under this section.
It is submitted that if the holder of the particular estate should prede-
cease the testator in the supposititious case, the heirs of A should take
as purchasers.
PART VI. EXECUTORY TRUSTS
Sec. 18. Executory Trust and the Rule: The Rule does not apply
to executory trusts.12 9 Executory trusts in the sense that the Rule does
not apply should be distinguished from trusts that are executory in that
the Statute of Uses does not operate upon them.13 0 If the testator has
defined precisely and in clear words the settlement to be made, the
trust is not executory in the meaning of the Rule, even though it requires
a conveyance by the trustee.' 3 ' A trust is executory so that the Rule
does not apply "only where the settlement to be made is to be executed,
or a conveyance made, by the trustee, and where there is an informal
or imperfect indication as to what the settlement is to be, or where
language used to describe the settlement is not intended by the settlor
or testator to be taken in its strict or legal sense. '13 2 In the early
12. 1 FEARNEx op. cit. supra note 3. at *34.
128 Ibid.
1271 PRESTON, Op. cit. supra note 3, at *293.
I28 1 Pl. Con. 340, 344a, 75 Eng. Rep. 516, 522 (C. B. 1568).
... Hooker v. Montague, 123 N. C. 154, 31 S. E. 705 (1898); 1 FEARNE,
op. cit. supra note 3, at *113-'147.
1"0 Note (1910) 23 E5Aav. L. REv. 488.
1 1 FEAItNE, op. cit. supra note 3. at *137.
232 KALES, op. cit. supra note 17, at §432.
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English case of Bagshaw v. Spencer,133 Lord Hardwick entertained thie
idea that all trusts were executory and therefore whenever there was a
trust the Rule did not apply. This has been repudiated in England and
a distinction is now drawn between an executory and an executed trust
for the purpose of applying the Rule.13 4
In the North Carolina case of Hooker v. Montague, "3 5 a four to
three decision announces the proposition that executory trusts do not
come within the Rule. The dissenting judges split from the majority on
the point of whether or not there was a conveyance of the legal title
to the trustee. In that case the limitation was as follows: '"that all my
property, real, mixed and personal, be converted into money [directions
to the executors] and be divided equally among my children, share and
share alike... ; that the shares falling to my daughters under the will
be placed in the hands of my son B as trustee for each of them ....
and he shall hold the same for life of each respectively, pay each the
yearly interest during the life of each, and to their individual heirs at
law after death of each of the said daughters respectively." Judge
Furches, writing the dissent, said that the relation of B with regard to
the fund was in the nature of guardian or manager of the estate ;136
and that the daughters received an equal absolute portion of proceeds
therefrom. The case is not too strong on its facts, for aside from the
question of trust it seems, upon close examination, that the limitation
attached to personal property, the money obtained by the executors
through converting the testator's estate into cash, and, of course, the
Rule does not apply to personal property. This point seems not to
have been raised. However, it is submitted that the proposition of law
that the case announces would be followed as a well-defined exception
to the Rule.
Mr. Kales points out that there are certain aids to construction in
determining whether or. not a trust is executory. A direction to the
trustees to make a conveyance containing certain limitations, raises only
an inference that the gift is imperfect. Where the direction to convey
was to A for life, remainder to A's heir or heirs of his body, it has been
regarded as executory. 187 However, where the direction was to convey
to A and the heirs of his body, the trust was said to be executed, on the
ground that direction was short and simple. If the settlement is fully
described, or to be made by the trustee by reference to another instru-
ment of complete limitation, the settlor is said to be his own conveyancer
and the trust is executed.' 3 8
"1 Ves. sen. 142, 27 Eng. Rep. 944 (1748).
... For a full discussion, see 1 FEAx E, op. cit. supra note 3, at *120.1"5 123 N. C. 154, 31 S. E. 705 (1898).
"'See id. at 161, 31 S. E. at 707 (dissenting opinion).
2, Papillon v. Voice, 2 P. Wins. 471, 24 Eng. Rep. 819 (1728).
"' KALES, op. cit. supra note 17, at §432.
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PART VII. POWER TO APPOINT
Sec. 19. Powers in General: Where the life tenant is donee of a
power to appoint, two types of problems arise: (1) if the limitation is
to A for life, with the power to appoint, and he subsequently appoints,
there is a question whether the requisites of the Rule have been satis-
fied; (2) if there is a gift over to heirs or the heirs of the body of A
on default of appointment, the issue is whether or not the presence of
power to appoint prevents the Rule from operating.
Sec. 19 (a). Where Limitation Is to A for Life with Power to
Appoint: The donee of a general power could appoint to himself if he
wished. If he appointed to his heirs inter vivos and the Rule were held
to apply, it might seem that the heirs could not be heard to object.
However, if the appointment was to the heirs of the body of A and A
died intestate, it is, since the abolition of estate tail in North Carolina,
an important issue whether or not the Rule applies. The statute abol-
ishing estate tails'39 does not say that heirs of the body shall not be
words designatio personarun ; it merely converts the (Atate tail into fee
simple. Those answering the description of "heirs of the body" might
well be a different class from those answering the description of "heirs"
and if the Rule operated, all those who qualified as heirs of the intestate
donee would share in the property that was subject to the appointment.
If, on the other hand, the Rule did not operate, only the "heirs of the
body" of A would take the entire property as purchasers under the
appointment.
If the life tenant is donee of a special power to appoint among
his heirs or the heirs of his body, the problem becomes more acute be-
cause of the nature of the power. If A appoints to his heirs or the heirs
of his body and the Rule operates to give A the fee, it defeats the
intention of the donor. It is true that the Rule in Shelleys Case
operates irrespective of the intent of the grantor, but in all other cases
the grantor uses the technical words "heirs" or "heirs of the body" in
the instrument which he himself executed. Then, too, a special power
is not considered to be property in the donee as is a general power. If
the donee of a special power to appoint by deed among his heirs, ap-
pointed to heirs of his body, it would raise the same problem referred
to in the case of an inter z'ivos exercise of a general power to the heirs
of his body.
There is not any case in point in North Carolina. The chief objec-
tion to the Rule applying to inter vivos exercise of powers in favor of
the heirs of the donee is that the life estate to the ancestor and remainder
to the heirs are not limited by the same instrument; a life estate without
any reference to an inheritance by remainder in the instrument that
... See sec. 7 supra.
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determines his estate is changed subsequently, by the act of some other
than the grantor, to an estate of inheritance. 140 Mr. Challis, in his
treatment of the Rule, thought that it should apply; that an estate
limited under a subsequent exercise of power contained in the instru-
ment creating the life estate was an estate arising under the same instru-
ment.14
1
Mr. Preston, in his treatment of the Rule, questions its application
to such a situation, contending that some of the English cases cited to
support the application of the Rule really go off on another point. 1 42
If the power given to the life tenant is solely testamentary or is in
fact exercised by will, an additional objection to the application of the
Rule arises. In such a case, it would seem that the termination of
the life estate by the death of the life tenant would prevent the Rule
from applying. If the testamentary appointment is to heirs of A, it
does not make any difference whether or not the Rule operates, for,
as pointed out in the early English case of Venables v. Morris,14 3 the
same people would take the same interest whether they took by descent
or purchase. But in that case, Lord Kenyon said that the case ought to
be decided on the ground that an appointment when executed is to be
considered in the same light as if it had been contained in the instrument
that created it. This might form the basis for an argument that the
Rule should apply even though the power was exercised by will.
Sec. 19 (b). Where the Limitation Is to A for Life, with Power
to Appoint, in Default of Appointment Gift Over: In such a limitation,
it has been held that the Rule does not apply. In the leading case of
Patrick v. Morehead,144 there was a devise of Blackacre to A for life,
and if "he has any lawful heirs, to them or any of them he may think
proper; if A died without issue ... the land is to be equally divided
among my grandchildren." A died intestate. It was held that A had a
life estate only. Speaking for the court, Ashe, J., said that the super-
added words "or any of them he may think proper" prevented the appli-
cation of the Rule, "and we do not conceive," he continued, "that it can
make any difference that the power has not in fact been exercised. It is
the existence [italics ours] of the power that affected the quality of the
estate. It could not be foreseen whether it would be exercised or not,
but it is enough to prevent the application of the Rule that the limita-
tion to the heirs of the devisee was coupled with a power the exercise
'40 In some cases this may be by the act of someone other than the life
tenant, for example, where there is a limitation to A for life, power in gross in
B, and B appoints to the heirs or heirs of the body of A either (1) by deed,
or (2) by will.
',' CHALLIS, op. cit. supra note 8, at 163.
142 1 PRESTON, op. cit. supra note 3, at *310-*312.
,"7 T. R. 438, 101 Eng. Rep. 1064 (1797).2185 N. C. 62 (1881).
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of which would prevent them from taking the same estate they would
have taken if the land had come to them by descent from him."'14
However, if a life estate with general power to appoint is given to
X and in default of appointment to A for life, remainder to heirs of
her body, and there is no appointment, the Rule operates.14
PART VIII. HEIRS OR HEIRS OF THE BODY AS
WORDS OF PURCHASE
Sec. 20. Superadded Words of Limitation: If the words "heirs"
or "heirs of the body," in the remainder are not used in their technical
sense, that is, to designate a class of persons to take in succession from
generation to generation, the Rule does not apply; the words in the
remainder then take effect as words of purchase. Just what will change
them into words of purchase varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
Since the decision in Shelley's Case itself, it has been held in England
that the addition of words of limitation in a remainder to the heirs or
the heirs of the body of the life tenant does not prevent the Rule from
operating.' 47 The Federal Courts and at least one state jurisdiction in
this country have reached the opposite result on the ground that since
primogeniture and estate tail have been abolished, the addition of words
of limitation might show that "heirs" was not used in its technical sense
to designate a class to take in succession from generation to generation,
but was used to designate particular persons to take as purchasers1 4s
Our court follows the English rule.' 49 The earliest case on the point
is Williams v. Holly, which held that the Rule applied. However, in
Jaris v. Wyatt'5 0 the court in a strong dictum held that the Rule
should not apply where there were superadded words of limitation. Be-
cause the point might be reopened, it is interesting to note the basis for
the dictum. Taylor, C. J., spoke of the testator's intention; Henderson,
"I Patrick v. Morehead, 85 N. C. 62, 69 (1881); see Graves v. Trueblood,
96 N. C. 495, 1 S. E. 918 (1887).
'
4 Helms. v. Collins, 200 N. C. 89, 156 S. E. 152 (1930).1 7 Helms. v. Collins, 200 N. C. 89, 156 S. E. 152 (1930) ; Jesson v. Wright,
2 Bligh. 1 (1820); CzrALLIs, op. cit. supra note 8, at 164; 1 FEARNE, op. cit.
supra note 3, at *185-*208; 3 JA.Mox, op. cit. supra note 124, at 1815 et seq. It is
true that the limitation in Shelley's Case was to the heirs male of the body of A,
heirs male of such hei-s male, and that superadded words of limitation ex-
pressly added nothing; the "heirs male of A" included by implication the subse-
quent words "heirs male of their bodies," for every heir male of the body of
the heir male of A is in the construction of the law an heir male of the body of A.
... Blythe v. Goode, 269 Fed. 544 (C. C. A. 4th, 1920); Aetna Life Ins. Co.
v. Hoppin, 214 Fed. 928 (C. C. A. 7th, 1914) ; Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Hoppin,
249 Ill. 406, 94 N. E. 669 (1911) (limitation to A and B for life, at the death
of survivor to the heirs of the body of A, their heirs and assigns forever)
KALEs, op. cit. supra note 17, at *418.
... Robeson: v. Moore, 168 N. C. 388, 84 S. E. 351 (1915) ; Ex parle McBee,
63 N. C. 332 (1869); Moore v. Parker, 34 N. C. 123 (1851); Folk v. Whitley,
30 N. C. 133 (1847); Williams v. Holly, 4 N. C. 266 (1815).
'O 11 N. C. 227 (1825).
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J., based it on the abolition of estate tail, while Hall, J., said, "equally
to be divided among them, to them and their heirs forever" made the
heirs take as purchasers.
Sec. 20 (a). "Heirs" in the Singular Used in the Remainder: If
the remainder is to the heirs of the life tenant, it does not matter whether
the plural or the singular of "heirs" is used; the Rule applies in both
instances, and so whether or not the words of limitation are super-
added.' 51 However, if the singular is used in a remainder to the heir
of the body of the life tenant and words of limitation are.superadded
to the remainder, the Rule does not apply. This is known as the Rule
in Archer's case and is a well-defined exception to the Rule in Shelley's
Case. In Archer's case, the limitation -was to A for life, remainder
to next heir male of A, and to the heirs male of the body of such next
heir male.. In order for the Rule in Archer's case to apply, the word
"heir" must be used clearly inconsistent with the collective sense.'52
For example, in a conveyance to A for life, remainder to next heir
male of A, the rule in Archer's case does not apply. And to A for life,
remainder to heirs male of the body of A and his heirs forever, but
if A dies without such heir male, then over to B, the rule in Archer's
case does not apply. The Rule in Shelley's Case applies to both of the
above examples. No case involving Archer's case has come up in
North Carolina.
Sec. 21. The Addition of "Share and Share Alike": If the words
"share and share alike" or the words "equally to be divided" are added
to a remainder to the heirs or heirs of the body of the life tenant, the
Rule does not apply.153
In Mills v. Thorne,'5 our court said such words prevent the Rule
from applying because they show that the issue or heirs are to take per
capita, that is, as tenants in common and not as heirs in line of suc-
cession. "To be divided" or "equally" or "between" or "amongst" or
"share and share alike", or similar words, make a tenancy in common.155
However, where the limitation is to A and B for life, and after the
death of A the land is to be divided equally between B and the heirs
of A's body, the Rule applies.
Sec. 22. Other Qualifying Words: If the superadded words are
explanatory and show that the testator did not intend to use "heirs" in
"I Sec. 19 supra.
.. Note (1914) 27 HARv. L. REv. 673.
"'Cheshire v. Drewry, 213 N. C. 450, 197 S. E. 1 (1938) ; Hore v. Schloss,
168 N. C. 97, 83 S. E. 306 (1914); Gilmore v. Sellars, 145 N. C. 283,' 59 S. E.
73 (1907); Mills v. Thorne, 95 N. C. 362 (1886); Ross v. Toms, 15 N. C.
376 (1833). 15495 N. C. 362 (1886).
a" Jones v. Oliver, 38 N. C. 369 (1844) (remainder was to the heirs of
body equally but the case went off on another point); Jenkins v. Jenkins, 96
N. C. 254, 2 S. E. 522 (1887) (equally among heirs of body of A).
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the remainder in its technical sense, they will take the limitation out of
the Rule. In Welch v. Gibson, in a poorly drafted will, the testator
devised Blackaere to A (his daughter) for life, at the death of A to
her bodily heirs, and "to go as entailed property for succeeding genera-
tions; all living children at the deatlh of A to have an equal share in
this property during the terms of their lives, [emphasis ours] and shall
go to the heirs of these said legatees from generation to generation."
The court held that the Rule did not apply, the underlined words above
being equivalent to "share and share alike."150
By statute 57 the word "heirs" means children under certain condi-
tions, but this does not prevent the Rule from operating'5 8 provided
the other requisites are contained in the limitation. Lide v. Wells is
an example of a case where "heirs" will be construed to mean children.
In the Wells case, the testator devised property in trust, the income to
be paid to A and B, and Blackacre was given to A so long as it
remains unsold by the trustee, provided A keeps up a hotel. The trust
was to last for twenty years, "at which time my said estate shall be
divided between the heirs of A and B per stirpes." It was held that
the Rule did not apply.159
Deeds and wills are often poorly drafted, with confusing superadded
words. A line cannot be drawn exactly describing just what groups of
words are sufficient to take the limitation out of the Rule. The decided
cases, however, will serve as guide posts. In Williams v. Beasley,10° the
deed was to A . . . "(1) provided A should have heirs or heirs of her
body to live and survive, then to said heirs, to them and their heirs for-
ever... (2) but if A should die and leave an heir or heirs of her body,
in that case the said heirs being her children or child, is to hold, occupy
and possess all the property herein given to them and their heirs for-
ever." It was held the Rule did not apply. The court said the clause
marked (2) made "heirs" a word of purchase. In Hodges v. Fleet-
wood,16l in the premises of the deed the conveyance was unto A, wife
of B, during her natural life, then to descend to her heirs, the children
of said B . . .[habendum] to them party of the second part, and their
heirs forever. It was held the Rule did not operate. The court said the
deed should read as if it were written to A for life, and after her death
to her children, the issue of B, and their heirs forever. In Marsh v.
Griffin, the habendum was to "A, the party of the second part, her heirs
and assigns during her natural life, and at her death then to belong
1. Welch v. Gibson, 193 N. C. 684, 138 S. E. 25 (1927).
157N. C. COD ANN. (Michie, 1939) c. 34, §1739.
156 See Sec. 7 supra.
189Lide v. Wells, 190 N. C. 37, 128 S. E. 477 (1925).16060 N. C. 102 (1863).
... Hodges v. Fleetwood, 102 N. C. 122, 9 S. E. 640 (1889).
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to her bodily heirs to have and to hold in fee simple."'16 2 The court
was inclined to think that the deed gave A a fee simple outright, but
said that the deed was in effect to A for life, remainder to heirs of her
body, and the Rule applied. In Smith v. Proctor, realty was conveyed
in trust for benefit of A "during his natural life, and in event said A
died not leaving lawful issue" over to B, "but in case lawful issue of
A," the trustee to make title "to the heir of A." It was held that the
Rule did not apply.163 Fillyaw v. Lear is a clear case of superadded
words taking the deed out of the Rule. In that case the habendum read
to "A for life, remainder to lawful heirs of her body who may be living
at her death and to the issue of such child or children who may die
before A and to their heirs and assigns forever."'164
PART IX. EXECUTORY LIMITATIONS OVER
Sec. 23. Effect in General: Limitations over, on the failure of heirs
or heirs of the body of the first taker, may raise the problem whether
or not a remainder is to be implied to such heirs or heirs of the body,
or issue. No case has presented this point to our court. 65 Limitations
over after a remainder to heir of A may be on the failure of heirs
living at the death of first taker, or on failure of issue or children;
here it is a question whether or not the limitation over has the effect
of superadded words which modify the remainder so as to take the
limitation out of the Rule.' 66
Sec.' 23 (a). Where There Is a Gift Over in Default of Heirs or the
Heirs of the Body of the First Taker: If a life estate is given to A,
remainder to the heirs or the heirs of the body of A, with a gift over
on default to the heirs of A or to any stranger of the blood of A, the
Rule operates. However, if the gift over is to some but not all of
the heirs of A, it has been held since the case of Bird v. Gilliam
1 67
that the Rule 'does not operate. The rule that a gift over to some but
not all of the heirs will take limitation out of the Rule became crystal-
lized in Puckett v. Morgan,'6 8 which has since been considered the lead-
ing case on the point. The decided cases involving limitations over on
default of heirs or the heirs of the body of the first taker may be classi-
fied as follows.
Sec. 23 (b). Remainder to the Heirs of the Body of A, in Default,
Gift Over to Heirs of A: The Rule applies. 169 In the leading case of
... Marsh v. Griffin, 136 N. C. 333, 48 S. E. 735 (1904).
.63 Smith v. Proctor, 139 N. C. 314, 51 S. E. 889 (1905).
"' Fillyaw v. Lear, 188 N. C. 772, 125 S. E. 544 (1924).
16. Notes (1911) 29 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1110.
"' Id., at 1115 et seq.
167 121 N. C. 326, 28 S. E. 489 (1897).
1(8 158 N. C. 344, 74 S. E. 15 (1912).
... Tyson v. Sinclair, 138 N. C. 23, 50 S. E. 450 (1905).
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Tyson v. Sinclair, there was a devise of Blackacre to A for life, then
to lawful heirs of his body in fee simple; on failing such lawful heirs
of his body, then to his right heirs in fee. In 'holding that the Rule
applied, the court said, "Any words added to the limitation which carry
the estate to any other person, in any other manner or quality, than
the canons of descent provide, will take the case out of the operation
of the Rule and limit the first taker to a life estate."170
Sec. 23 (b) (1). Reminder to the Heirs or Heirs of the Body of A,
in Default, Gift Over to the Children of A: The Rule does not apply.
Chief Justice Stacy, in Edwards v. Faulkner 71 collects and distin-
guishes the cases applicable to this type of limitation.
Sec. 23 (c). Remainder to the Heirs or the Heirs of the Body of A,
Gift Over in Default of Heirs or the Heirs of the Body to the Brothers
and Sisters of A: The Rule does not apply.1 72 The gift over is to some
but not all of the heirs of A. 173 Bird v. Gilliam is the first case in
the books announcing this principle. In the Gilliam case, the devise
was as follows: to A (daughter of testator) for life, remainder to the
heirs of her body, but if A has no heirs of her body, then to B (brother
of A) and the heirs of his body. It was held the Rule did not apply.
In a short opinion, Montgomery, J., speaking for the court, said, "but
there were explanatory words where the testator said 'but if my daughter
A should not have lawful heirs of her body gift over.' Such words
have been construed by this court to mean issue."' 74 The court then
cites Rollins v. Keel.175 In the Keel case, the testator devised real prop-
erty as follows: "to my wife, W, until my son, J, is eighteen, then to J
in fee; if J dies without lawful heir, then to W during her widowhood,
afterwards to A (brother of testator) in fee." J died without leaving
issue or brother or sister. The court held that in construing the will
"to die without heir" would be taken to mean "to die without issue" for
upon J's death without issue or brother or sister or issue of such, his
mother would take as his heir, to defeat the intent of the testator.
There was no positive rule of law like the Rule in Shelley's Case
involved in Rollins v. Keel. It might well be argued that the Keel
case should not be controlling where the Rule is involved. However,
the principle of Bird v. Gilliam has repeatedly met the approval of our
Supreme Court. It was adopted as the basis for the decision in Puckett
270 Id., at 25, 50 S. E. 450.
171215 N. C. 586, 2 S. E. (2d) 662 (1940).1 7
' Gurganus v. Bullock, 210 N. C. 670, 188 S. E. 85 (1936); Doggett v.
Vaughan, 199 N. C. 424, 154 S. E. 660 (1930); Bird v. Gilliam, 121, N. C. 326,
28 S. E. 489 (1897).17'Doggett v. Vaughan, 199 N. C. 424, 154 S. E. 660 (1930); Puckett v.
Morgan, 158 N. C. 344, 74 S. E. 100 (1912).
17' A remainder to the issue of A is not within the Rule. See Sec. 12 (a) supra.
.7. 115 N. C. 68, 20 S. E. 209 (1894).
[Vol. 20
1941] THE RULE IN SHELLEY'S CASE IN N. C. 77
v. Morgan,176 the leading case on this type of limitation. If the doc-
trine of the Keel case is controlling, it is submitted that it should have
the effect of superadded words modifying the remainder and thus take
the limitation out of the Rule."7 However, the court has put too much
stress on the nature of the limitation over as evidence of testator's or
grantor's paramount intention. See the development of the doctrine
below.
Sec. 23 (d). Remainder to the Heirs or the Heirs of the Body of A
in Default Gift Over to the Half-Sister of A: The Rule operates to
give the first taker a fee. In the leading case of Benton v. Baucom 78
the devise was to A (stepdaughter of testator) for life, remainder to
her lawful heirs, if any; if not, then to "my [testator's own] three
children." It was -held the Rule operated. Puckett v. Morgan was not
mentioned in the decision, but in Welch v. Gibson,'79 Stacy, J., dis-
tinguishes Puckett v. Morgan. He said, "When there is an ulterior
limitation which provides that upon the happening of a given contin-
gency the estate is to be taken out of the first line of descent and then
put back into the same line in a restricted manner by giving it to some
but not all of those who presumptively would have shared in the estate
as being potentially among the heirs general of the first taker, these
circumstances with others may be used as one of the guides in ascer-
taining the paramount intention 80 of the testator and with other indicia
it has been held sufficient to show that the words 'heirs or the heirs of the
body' were not used in their technical sense."''s
See. 23, (e). Remainder to Heirs or the Heirs of the Body of A,
in Default Gift Over to Next of Kin of A: The Rule does not apply.'8 2
In the leading case of May v. Lewis, the court discussed the meaning of
"next of kin" and held that it brought the limitation within the doctrine
of Puckett v. Morgan.
Sec. 23 (f). Remainder to Heirs or the Heirs of the Body of A, in
Default Gift Over to A's Nearest Relatives: The Rule does not apply.' 8 3
In Fields v. Rollins, Hoke, J., said that "nearest relatives"p means "next
of kin," and "when there is a limitation over to a restricted class of
heirs of the first taker on his death without heirs or heirs of his body,
this in itself [italics mine] will show that the words in the first in-
17- 158 N. C. 344, 74 S. E. 15 (1912) (Devise to A [grand-daughter of testator]
for life, then to her bodily heirs if any, but if she have none, back to her brothers
and sisters). "" Sec. 14 supra.17.192 -N. C. 630, 130 S. E. 629 (1926).1 70193 N. C. 684, 138 S. E. 25 (1927).
1"0 See Sec. 6 supra, on Intent of Testator.
1.1 Welch v. Gibson, 193 N. C. 684, 138 S. E. 25 (1927).
.2 Williamson v. Cox, 218 N. C. 177, 10 S. E. (2d) 662 (1940); Wallace v.
Wallace, 181 N. C. 158, 106 S. E. 501 (1921) ; Jones v. Whichard, 163 N. C. 241,
79 S. E. 503 (1913) ; May v. Lewis, 132 N. C. 115, 43 S. E. 550 (1903).
"" Fields v. Rollins, 186 N. C. 221, 119 S. E. 207 (1923).
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stance were not used or intended as words of general inheritance under
our canons of descent, but must be taken and construed to mean issue
in the sense of children or grandchildren."'l8 4
Sec. 23 (g). Remainder to the Heirs or the Heirs of the Body of A,
in Default Gift Over to Designated Persons, Strangers to the Blood
of A: The Rule applies.' 85 In Morrisett v. Stevens,'80 the limitation
was to A (brother of testator) for life, remainder to the heirs of A in
fee, if A dies without heirs of the body, to Betty Stevens in fee. It was
held the Rule applied. Montgomery, J., said, "The ulterior devise by
way of remainder in event that the ancestor should die, without heirs of
his body' need not be considered, for the first taker died leaving heirs,
his children, who are plaintiffs in this action.' ' 1s7 In Jones v.
Whichard,88 the court said that in Morrisett v. Stevens "the ulterior
disposition was not, and was not intended as, a limitation on the estate
conveyed to the first taker, but was a provision whereby one stock of
inheritance, on certain contingencies, was substituted for another, the
second to hold as purchasers direct from the grantor or original
owners."'
89
Though the Stevens case may be doubtful authority for this classifi-
cation, the proposition stated above seems to be supported by Williams
v. R. R.10 In that case, there was a -devise to A (grandson of the
testator) for life, then to his bodily heirs in fee, but in event he dies
without issue, gift over to B (Plummer Williams) and C (Wiley Wil-
liams). The case does not make it clear who B and C were. It was
held that the Rule operated. However, this case may be explained away
on the ground that the devisee over executed a quitclaim deed to A.
Sec. 23 (h). Remainder to the Heirs of the Body of A in Default,
Gift Over to the Heirs of the Testator: The Rule does not apply where
the life estate was to a child or children of the testator.' 9 '
Sec. 23 (i). Remainder to the Heirs of A, in Default, Gift Over to
Testator's Estate: The Rule does not apply where the life estate is to a
child or children. In Reed v. Neal'92 the court said "to return to my
2,
4 Id. at 223, 119 S. E. at 208.
.. Williams v. Norfolk S. R. R., 200 N. C. 771, 158 S. E. 473 (1931);
MIorrisett v. Stevens, 136 N. C. 160, 48 S. E. 661 (1904).
' 136 N. C. 160, 48 S. E. 661 (1904).
1
17 Id. at 161, 48 S. E. at 661. 188163 N. C. 241, 79 S. E. 503 (1913).
... The court no doubt is here classifying Morriselt v. Stevens with cases like
Whitfield v. Garris, 134 N. C. 24, 45 S. E. 904 (1903) (Testator devised to A,
and in the event of death of A without children, then to the grandchildren
of the testator. Held, fee simple in A defeasable on the happening of the con-
tingency.) The difference in the two types of limitations is apparent on exami-
nation. In the latter there is no remainder to the heirs.
"80200 N. C. 771, 158 S. E. 473 (1931).
1.1 Blackledge v. Simmons, 180 N. C. 535, 105, S. E. 202 (1920). Cf. White-
hurst v. Bowers, 205 N. C. 541, 172 S. E. 180 (1934). In that case it is not
clear whether or not A was a child of the grantor.
1' 12 N. C. 192, 108 S. E. 769 (1921).
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estate" was the same as "to return to my heirs" and Puckett v. Morgan
takes it out of the Rule.193
Sec. 23 (j). Remainder to the Heirs or the Heirs of the Body of A,
in Default, Gift Over to Brothers of the Testator: The Rule applies.' 94
In Walker v. Butner, 95 the devisee over, brother of the testator, con-
veyed his interest to A, the life tenant. (A was an adopted child of the
testator.) The court mentioned the fact that this conveyance cured
any tefect there was in the title, but further said that upon the plain
language of the will, A took a fee simple, defeasible if she die leaving
no issue, and cited Morrisett v. Stevens as authority.
Sec. 23 (k). Where There Is a Life Estate to Children of Testator,
Remainder to Heirs of the Body, in Default, Gift Over to Testator's
Family: In Radford v. Rose,' 96 there was a devise to A, B, C and D
(all of the testator's children, apparently) for life, then to their heirs
provided they have any that have attained the age of twenty-one, but if
they (A, B, C and D), my children, have no bodily heirs, gift over to
Rose (testator's) family. Should they have an heir at their death
not twenty-one years of age, that the said heir shall be in possession at
the age of twenty-one of its share of the estate. The case offers some
delicate problems in construction of the will. The court came to the
conclusion that it should read: "I loan to them [A, B, C and D]
[for] their lifetime, and then to their heirs, but should they have no
bodily heirs the property shall go back to the Rose (testator's) family,
provided heirs under the age of twenty-one shall not take possession
until they reach that age." It was held that the life tenants obtained a
defeasible fee. The court cited Tyson v. Sinclair, 97 saying that it
was almost directly in point. In the Rose case,19 8 Allen, J., said that
the Rule operated, for, "the plaintiff being a Rose," if she died without
having had children, her heirs and the heirs of her father, the testator,
would be the Rose family, and this fact marks the distinction between this
case and Puckett v. Morgan, and Jones v. Whichard.
In Hampton v. Griggs,9 9 there was a devise of Blackacre to A
(son 'of testator) for life, and then unto the lawful heirs of A, and if
my son should die without a bodily heir, then gift over to Hampton
2" That is, the heirs of the testator might be some, but would not be all of
the heirs of the life tenant. The court said the devise should be read as if it
were "to A for life, and at her death, I give it to her issue, if any; if none,
to my heirs."
19, Walker v. Butner, 187 N. C. 535, 122 S. E. 301 (1824) (Limitation to A
for life, then to heirs of A; if she should not leave any heirs, over to B
[brother of testator]). 195 Ibid.
209 178 N. C. 288, 100 S. E. 249 (1919).
107 138 N. C. 23, 50 S. E. 450 (1905). See Sec. 23(b) supra.
"I Radford v. Rose, 178 N. C. 288, 291, 100 S. E. 249 (1919). See Sec.
23(c) supra.199 184 N. C. 13, 113 S. E. 501 (1922).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
(testator's) family. It was held that the Rule does not operate. Stacy,
C. J., writing for the court, said, "Members of the Hampton family,
of course, are potentially among the heirs general of the first taker;
but they are not all, and this -ulterior limitation would exclude others
among his heirs who were not of the blood of the original sto~k." 200
The court classified this case with Puckett v. Morgan20 1 and said that
it was to be distinguished from Tyson v. Sinclair20 2 and Radford v.
Rose.
The Griggs case does not attempt to overrule the Rose case, but to
the contrary approves it. It is difficult to see from the reports wherein
the cases 'differ. Perhaps the record of the cases would untangle the
matter. It might be that in the Rose case the testator left the property
to all of his children, while in the Griggs case, it was left to only one of
a number of children. But it is hard to see that this would change the
situation. Perhaps the court in the Rose case was looking at the situa-
tion at the time of the suit. Such would indeed be a dangerous prac-
tice in applying the Rule. It is not necessary for the life tenant in fact
to have an heir of the body in order for the Rule to operate on a limita-
tion to A for life, remainder to heirs of his body. In the light of the
decided cases, it is submitted that where there is a life estate to the
children of the testator, remainder to the heirs of the body, gift over in
default, to the testator's family, the Rule should not operate.
Sec. 23 (1). Remainder to Heirs of Body, in Default Gift Over
to Nearest Heirs of A: This is an open question.2 03
CONCLUSION
The Rule in Shelley's Case originated in the fifteenth century, if
not before, when real property was held under feudal tenure. It is a
rule of law which, from its origin, operates irrespective of the intent
of grantor or testator, as the case may be. For generation after gener-
ation it has been carried down to the present day as a part of our
common law. Some modern American courts, like our Supreme Court,
have put much stress on the intention of the testator or grantor, in an
effort to restrict its application. This has tended only to make a com-
plex rule all the more complicated in its application. Since the reasons
for the origin of the Rule and the justification for its existence have
long ago 'disappeared, it should be abolished by legislative enactment.
200 Id. at 19, 113 S. E. 501.
201 See Sec. 23(c) supra. 202 See Sec. 23(b) supra.
2
' See White v. Norman, 185 N. C. 1, 115 S. E. 822 (1923).
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